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This article reviews books which test the personalization of politics, looking at
different dimensions of the growing importance of leaders over time, namely
for political parties, in electoral behaviour and in the media. Only recently have
wide-ranging comparative longitudinal studies on leaders been carried out. The
personalization thesis is not equally demonstrated across all dimensions. Indeed,
we ﬁnd something of a puzzle: There is no strong trend towards personalization
of party organizations, whereas in electoral behaviour the evidence points to the
increasing use by voters of leaders as heuristics. This attests to the decline of the
importance of parties. The personalization of media may be the mechanism
which explains the change in voting behaviour, and the third and ﬁnal section
of the review looks into that arena. We conclude with some suggestions on
further research on the personalization of politics.
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In January 2017 Donald Trump was inaugurated as the forty-ﬁfth
president of the United States. Trump’s ability to win the Republican
Party nomination, against the will of the party grandees, went against
the received political science wisdom, which placed party elites in
charge of the choice of presidential candidates in the US (Cohen et al.
2009). His subsequent victory against Democratic candidate Hillary
Clinton further challenged the idea that the two parties controlled
access to American institutions. Trumpism is a clear sign of the decline
of political parties as institutional gatekeepers and is symptomatic of
the rise of the media-driven, outsider leader. Yet is this a speciﬁcally
American phenomenon, or has it spread to other countries?
In Italy, the rise of Silvio Berlusconi as leader of Forza Italia and
the longest-serving prime minister of Italy is perhaps the closest
parallel to Trump. Berlusconi was also an outsider – a media and
construction billionaire – who stormed Italian politics. He was elected
as MP in 1994 and went on to serve on three different occasions as
prime minister of Italy (1994–5, 2001–6 and 2009–11). Berlusconi,
unlike Trump, created his own party, at a time when the party system
in Italy was imploding (Bartolini et al. 2004) under the weight of
tangentopoli. Despite being dogged by the judiciary for most of his
mandates, he dominated politics in Italy for more than a decade.
Another Italian politician, Beppe Grillo, the leader of the
Movimento 5 Stelle (5 Star Movement – M5S) is also a clear example
of a mediatized personality, in this case using the internet to gain
visibility. His party has been described as belonging to a personal
party model (Diamanti 2014). He illustrates the importance that new
media may have in the process of the personalization of politics
which has been recurrent in Italy. Founded in 2009, M5S won
25 per cent of the vote in the 2013 legislative elections and 109 seats
in the Italian parliament, becoming the second largest party in Italy.
The election of Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa as president of Portugal
can also be counted as one of the more recent cases of the extreme
mediatization of politics. Despite not being the head of government,
the president of Portugal holds important prerogatives both in terms
of veto power and in relation to the dissolution of the Assembly,
which can be crucial when governments are weak (Amorim Neto and
Lobo 2009). Although Rebelo de Sousa has been a centre-right party
member for most of his active life, and was even leader of the Partido
Social Democrata (PSD) between 1996 and 1999, Marcelo – as he is
known to the Portuguese – became a household name from 2000
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because of his weekly political commentary shown on open access
television networks. Marcelo is, to a large extent, a product of the
media, where he carefully crafted an image of a likable politician over
the course of 15 years. In 2015 he decided to run for the presidency
against the wishes of the PSD leader, Pedro Passos Coelho, who saw
him as an outsider. He persevered nonetheless, running a campaign
with little funding and winning the presidential election on the ﬁrst
round in January 2016 with 52 per cent of the vote.
Beyond the process of mediatization, another common
phenomenon is the growing autonomy of leaders from the party
organization across the ideological spectrum. Indeed, the rise of Jer-
emy Corbyn as leader of the British Labour Party may be signalling the
same kind of decline of party structures, albeit at the opposite end of
the party spectrum. A long-standing MP and representative of the most
left-wing group in the Labour Party, Corbyn’s election in the summer
of 2015 was partly a story of the party grassroots rejecting the candi-
dates with mainstream party support. Just as the Republican Party was
surprised by Trump, the venerable 115-year-old Labour Party did not
really think Corbyn could win (Wintour and Watt 2015).
The trend of new leaders who criticize the mainstream political
elites can also be found elsewhere. We see it in the case of Beppe
Grillo described above, but also more recently in Southern Europe
with the rise of Alexis Tsipras in Greece (Baboulias 2016) and Pablo
Iglesias, Podemos leader in Spain. They are examples of leaders who
dominate their parties and represent a left-wing drive to reject the
political status quo.
These examples show that the emerging trend of ‘outsider
leaders’ should not be exclusively associated with the right wing of
the party spectrum. Nor should it be confused with the phenomenon
of populism, which includes other characteristics (Mudde and
Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). The rise of outsider party leaders may be
seen partly as a corollary of the decline of political parties which has
been occurring in the last few decades in advanced industrial
democracies. This decline has been measured in terms of member-
ship (van Biezen et al. 2012), but can also be seen in the decline of
trust in political institutions (Dalton 2013). It is no coincidence that
Berlusconi emerged in Italy in the mid-1990s. Indeed, at that time,
the Italian party system was imploding due to a large-scale judicial
investigation into corruption which affected all parties who had been
involved in government since the end of the Second World War.
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More generally, the trend towards an increasing distance between
political parties and society has paved the way for a looser relation-
ship between citizens and politics, making the latter more open to
political entrepreneurs. Parties have evolved from society-based
actors, with strong links to civil societies in advanced democracies
in the 1960s and 1970s, to catch-all formats that were more adapted
to the growing individualization of society (Krouwel 2006). This
‘divorce by mutual consent’ evolved in the last few decades into
a cartel system of state-dependent political parties (Katz and Mair
1995). Arguably, the progressive hollowing-out of political parties as
territorial organizations has contributed to the rise in the importance
of the media as intermediaries for establishing relations between
political incumbents and society. It has also favoured leader-centric
developments in election campaigns as well as government organi-
zations (Poguntke and Webb 2005).
In addition, it is important to note that in several countries where
the phenomenon of personalization of politics was already apparent,
namely Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece or the UK, the last few years
have been characterized by economic crisis and continued recession,
due to the onset of the Great Recession in 2008. Indeed, the ﬁnancial
crisis that began in the US in 2008 and quickly became a crisis of
public ﬁnances in Europe meant that countries with larger public
debts and underlying weaknesses in their economic indicators found
it increasingly difﬁcult to access the ﬁnancial markets. In Europe,
politicians in most countries had to impose austerity policies to fulﬁl
external commitments to an increasingly dissatisﬁed electorate. The
crisis which took place in the eurozone from 2008 onwards may have
compounded feelings that existing mainstream parties simply cannot
deliver the prosperity which citizens have become used to, in turn
rendering citizens more willing to listen to outsiders who can now
criticize the mainstream not only for their cartel behaviour in
organizational terms, but also for their lack of positive economic
results (Lewis-Beck and Lobo 2017).
It is, however, important to understand that this phenomenon of
leader-centric politics is not conﬁned to the populist or new parties,
nor should it be. Across Europe, for the last decades we have
witnessed the appearance of several media-centric leaders, such as
Tony Blair in Britain, Nicolas Sarkozy in France, or José-Luis Rodrí-
guez Zapatero in Spain, and there have been important studies on
this topic (Aarts et al. 2013; Poguntke and Webb 2005). Indeed, there
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have been attempts to track the personalization of politics from an
organizational, campaign and voter perspective. More recent devel-
opments concerning the appearance of outsider leaders highlight
the extent to which advanced democracies and their electorates are
open to such formats. Indeed, given the recent developments in
Europe and elsewhere, the fundamental question posed in this
review article is: How can we understand the leaders’ place and their
growing importance in democratic political systems?
The books we are reviewing are important not only given the
recent political developments, but also given the fact that mainstream
political science has tended to neglect the study of leadership.
Indeed, there has not been nearly enough academic work on this
topic. The absence of work arises from a combination of factors.
Leaders and leadership are concepts that are close to the concept of
power and are inherently difﬁcult to quantify and measure. In the
last decades, the quantiﬁcation drive in political science has, thus,
made it harder for leaders to be at the centre of political analysis.
Instead they have often been neglected in favour of more easily
quantiﬁable aspects of political science. Not only that, but the fact
that much of what is understood as political science today grew out
of political sociology has meant that a sociological perspective on
politics has informed much of the discipline, especially when we
discuss its electoral dimensions as well as the party literature. Still on
the methodological front, the progressive fragmentation of different
aspects of political science hampers the understanding of the role of
leaders, as those who focus on public policy seldom dialogue with
electoral studies specialists or party researchers. Whereas leaders may
have an impact on all these arenas, there is a lack of integrated
studies aiming to understand leaders.
That said, the problem of leadership studies is not derived solely
from methodological reasons. Whereas in other areas of study where
leaders matter, such as business studies, the concept of leadership has
remained very ﬁrmly at the centre of research, in political science it
has been residual. This is partly due to normative ideas about
democracy that formed in the light of European political experiences
at the beginning of the twentieth century and which have funda-
mentally shaped the way politics is conceived in the discipline today.
Following the leader-centric totalitarian and authoritarian regimes
which led to two world wars in Europe, there was an urge to promote
democracy as a process – vide David Easton’s conceptions of the
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political system. Since the 1980s, attempts to place institutions at the
centre of political life moved the discipline away from sociological
interpretations of politics and rarely emphasized the role of leaders
within institutions.
Several recent review articles on leaders and personalization have
noted a number of these key problems (Barisione 2009; Garzia 2014;
Lobo 2014). Even so, some scholars have researched the growing
importance of leaders – at elections, in parties and also within
governments – the so-called presidentialization of politics (Poguntke and
Webb 2005). Given the rise of politicians who seem to transcend party
structures, as well as the debate on the centrality of leaders, the funda-
mental challenge is for scholarship to fully incorporate leaders in political
analysis. More recently, the ﬁeld has been engaging in the measurement
of ‘leaders’ and ‘leadership’ in a comparative and contextual way,
especially in the electoral ﬁeld (Aarts et al. 2013; Bittner 2011; Lobo and
Curtice 2015). I have contributed to the measurement of the importance
of leaders in a comparative context by seeking to integrate leaders – as
party leaders – in the study of elections. I have tested the hypothesis that
leaders of catch-all parties should be more important than leaders of
mass-based parties for their voters (Lobo 2008). In addition, I have also
researched the link between dealigned voters and leader effects, showing
that indeed leaders matter more for those without a party identiﬁcation
(Lobo 2015). This latter research informs us about the phenomenon
of personalization as studies show that there is a rising trend of voter
dealignment (van Biezen et al. 2012).
The volumes reviewed in this article constitute an important
step forward in the study of the role of leaders and personalities
in democracies. This is due to the fact that they are all longitudinal.
The initial studies on personalization were rarely able to draw
on the systematic data contained in several of the books presented
here. What really singles out the books reviewed in this article is
that they are properly testing the idea of the growing importance
of leaders.
With the exception of the book edited by Gianluca Passarelli
(2015), all of the volumes reviewed here deal with the concept
of personalization rather than the presidentialization of politics.
‘Personalization’, on the one hand, seeks to identify leaders not
only as important, but increasingly important for political parties, both
from the perspective of party organization as well as their electoral
effects (Karvonen 2010). ‘Presidentialization’, on the other hand, is
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the process whereby parliamentary regimes are becoming more
presidential in their actual practice – in government, in party and in
elections – without, in most cases, changing their formal structure,
that is, their regime-type (Mughan 2000; Poguntke and Webb 2005).
Presidentialization therefore, encompasses personalization.
Given the fundamental challenge of understanding leaders’ place
and growing importance in democratic polities, we will group the
analysis in terms of parties and leaders (Cross and Pilet 2015 and
Passarelli 2015), elections and leaders (Garzia 2014), and media
and leaders (Langer 2011 and D’Arma 2015). After considering
each volume’s merits, we will highlight what are the perceived
consequences of a growing role for leaders in democracies. In the
conclusion, we consider future directions of research that could be
undertaken to advance the ﬁeld.
LEADERS AND PARTIES
The volume by William Cross and Jean-Benoit Pilet, The Politics of Party
Leadership (2015), makes use of a wealth of data on political leaders in 14
countries between 1965 and 2012, collected through the Comparative
Study of Party Leaders (COSPAL) project.1 To my knowledge, this is the
ﬁrst time such a large data set on party leaders has been constituted,
which allows the authors to ask very important questions on the extent to
which parties are becoming personalized (leader-centric), and with
what consequences for democracy. It should be welcomed because it
signals for the ﬁrst time a move towards a systematic and longitudinal
comparative study of party leaders, which hitherto had been mostly
analysed on a case-by-case format, even when the overall framework was
comparative.
According to Cross and Pilet, analysing the politics of party
leadership implies looking at leader selection, the dynamics of leader
races, and leader termination. Most chapters use multivariate regres-
sion analyses, which allow for the systematic testing of hypotheses
regarding one of these aspects.
How much change in the party leader selectorate has occurred
between 1965 and 2012? This indicator is crucial for an under-
standing of the degree of personalization of politics because directly
electing the leader by members or electors (primaries) is an indicator
of a more leader-centric party. Yet, as the volume shows, parties are
conservative institutions. Party leader selectorate changes have been
REVIEW ARTICLE 7
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relatively scarce. Indeed, most parties continue to select their leaders
through locally chosen delegates (54 per cent) although 25 per cent
do have selection via all party members. Therefore, importantly,
despite worries about the personalization of parties, it is not the case
that the direct election of the party leader has become widespread.
The ﬁrst chapter, by Marco Lisi, André Freire and Oscar Barberá,
tests the convergence hypothesis – that is, whether, regardless of the
genetic model of party organization, political parties are adopting
the direct election of the leader (Cross and Pilet 2015: 14), thus following
the trend towards a personalization of politics (van Biezen et al. 2012;
Katz and Mair 1995, 2009; Scarrow 2000). The authors ﬁnd that there is a
convergence to more directly elected leaders in all party families – with
the exception of the Communists, who are least likely to have a direct
election of party leader – when the data are considered on a decade-by-
decade basis. However, in the last decade, there is no real difference
between left- and right-wing political parties in this respect. The main
difference is that the left started earlier, in the 1970s and 1980s, and the
right followed in the 1990s and 2000s. These ﬁndings point to the fact
that although party families seem to matter, change is affecting more or
less all families, rather than pertaining to any one particular family.
This book’s use of an extensive data set and sophisticated techniques
as well as its longitudinal scope make it a watershed in the study of the
personalization of leaders for parties. It shows that, perhaps contrary to
what some expect, the trend towards the direct election of the party
leader is not overwhelming. In addition, it is not typical of either side of
the ideological spectrum, or of a given party family. So, it is an overall
modest party trend. This is conﬁrmed in the chapter by Mihail Chiru,
Sergiu Gherghina and Juan Rodriguez-Teruel which seeks to explain
changes to leadership selection rules. Taken together, these two chap-
ters point towards a convergence pattern which crosses ideological
frontiers in terms of the direct election of the leader.
Overall, this book also tends to show that the impact which direct
election of the leader has in terms of the internal dynamics is small.
The competitiveness of leadership races increases (chapter by Ofer
Kenig, Gideon Rahat and Or Tuttnauer); the direct election of lea-
der does not seem to bring in more women leaders (chapter by Bram
Wauters and Jean-Benoit Pilet), nor does it make a large difference
for either renewal or termination.
What is perhaps lacking in Cross and Pilet’s volume is an overt
strategy towards understanding what drives the personalization of
8 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
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parties – or rather the trend towards the direct election of the leader.
Rather, Cross and Pilet’s approach aims to be more of a compre-
hensive study of the politics of party leadership. In each chapter,
authors choose the most relevant dependent variable and indepen-
dent variables and formulate hypotheses, which allows for the testing
of multiple hypotheses in a thorough way. However, it also leads to
some fragmentation and lack of an overall narrative on the (modest)
trend towards the direct election of party leaders.
In his edited book, The Presidentialization of Political Parties, Gianluca
Passarelli (2015) concurs with Cross and Pilet in afﬁrming the con-
servative nature of party organizations, by placing party genetics
centre-stage in explaining the degree of party presidentialization.
The book’s aim is to understand why party presidentialization varies
between countries. The presidentialization of parties in this context
refers to the ‘greater autonomy [that has been given] to the leader,
with great independence on crucial political topics, namely the
electoral campaign, ministerial appointments and public policies’.
The book’s main hypothesis builds on Samuels and Shugart’s (2010)
work. They argue that party organization tends to mimic constitu-
tional structure. Thus, to the extent that the constitutional structure
separates executive and legislative origins and survival, parties will
tend to be presidentialized. Passarelli (2015: 11) argues that the
degree of party presidentialization, which depends on constitutional
structure, will also depend on the party’s genetics, namely the ori-
ginal organizational characteristics of a party’s construction and
development; the presence or absence at the party’s origin of an
external sponsor; and the role of charisma in the party’s formation.
The book is structured in the following way: each chapter starts by
illustrating the constitutional design and form of government of the
selected case, thus identifying the degree of presidentialization which
exists in each case. Then the authors identify party features that may
inhibit or emphasize the effects of constitutional structure on parties’
presidentialization. The cases include Australia, Brazil, Chile, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Poland, the US, Ukraine and the UK. They
have been chosen due to their variation in constitutional structure.
Each case is categorized, from the most presidentialized to the
least presidentialized, namely presidential; president-parliamentary;
premier-presidential; parliamentary. The genetic party categories
vary from presidentialized/national to factional/local. The focus is
on parties which have been in power between the 1990s and 2012.
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The results tend to conﬁrm the initial hypotheses: namely, the pre-
sidentialization of political parties is a phenomenon that must inevitably
arise in presidential regimes, but that has also occurred in semi-
presidential ones; also, the genetic characteristics of political parties
function as an intervening variable capable of accentuating the
opportunities offered by the institutions from a presidentialization
perspective (Passarelli 2015: 236). The author further ﬁnds that in
parliamentary systems, strict presidentialization does not occur. None-
theless, there are signs of political personalization in all parliamentary
cases considered. In Germany and Japan there is limited autonomy of
the prime minister. Oreste Massari is sceptical about the degree of presi-
dentialization possible in Italy because Berlusconi’s party, Forza Italia,
despite being highly presidentialized, was ephemeral due to the lack of
institutional and constitutional opportunities which could have offered
lasting support to the party’s presidentialization generated by its genetic
characteristics. Richard Hayton and Timothy Heppell argue that the
UK is a case where personalization has occurred in a context of
enduring parliamentarism.
This book is therefore important in that it seeks to develop not only
David Samuels and Matthew Shugart’s (2010) work, but also the
presidentialization thesis originally developed in 2005 by Thomas
Poguntke and Paul Webb. It does so in an elegant form, where the
genetic characteristics of parties are brought in as explanatory
factors to distinguish between differences in presidential regimes, such
as the US vs Chile, and semi-presidential regimes such as France and
Poland.
However, it would have been useful if Passarelli had made an effort
to quantify the organizational characteristics towards personali-
zation to make the trends clearer. In addition, the book does not really
account for changes in the speed towards personalization in each
country, given the attention paid to the continuity of parties since their
birth, rather than change. Passarelli (2015: 246) does highlight the
direct election of party leaders as the most important party trait deter-
mining the level of personalization of parties, a sign not only ‘of an
attempt to partially overcome the growing lack of democratic legitimacy,
but also a deliberate initiative for a greater centralisation of power in the
hands of central ofﬁce and the party leader’. To single out this trait is
particularly important, because it signals how quantitative research on
the personalization of parties can progress, namely by focusing on
the drivers of this trend, which is the focus of Cross and Pilet’s volume.
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LEADERS AND ELECTIONS
The third book presented in this review, Diego Garzia’s Personalization
of Politics and Electoral Change (2014), is ambitious not only theoretically,
but also empirically. According to Garzia (2014: 2), ‘if the growing
role of party leaders as drivers of partisanship is taken into account,
and properly modelled in the voting equation, then their electoral
effect emerges as much stronger than it has usually appeared’.
The book compares three countries, Britain, the Netherlands and
Germany, which were chosen because of their institutional differences
as well as the availability of longitudinal data. It focuses on individual
data from 1961 onwards.
The book’s premise goes beyond Passarelli’s. Garzia (2014: 19)
argues that, ‘as a result of the process of party transformation, partisan
loyalties have shifted accordingly from a mere reﬂection of previous
socio-ideological identities to the result of individual attitudes towards
more visible partisan objects – and in particular their leaders’. In such
a context, it may well be that a party’s appeal has become increasingly
shaped by its own leader’s image.
As a result, the author proposes an alternative scenario for the
analysis of voting behaviour. Party leaders, instead of being seen as
residuals in a socio-psychological model of voting, become drivers of
partisan attachment at the individual level. In order to test that
proposition, several things are needed. Namely, changing the con-
ception of party identiﬁcation to partisanship, drawing on literature
which acknowledges that party identiﬁcation is not static, but has
several inﬂuences. If that is the case, and there is indeed endogeneity
between a party and its leader, we can no longer take party
identiﬁcation as immune from leader effects.
Proper modelling – namely two-stage estimation and instrumental
variables – allows the author to show the behavioural consequences
of personalization. Namely, that leader effects are stronger than
normally assumed, and that they have been increasing over time.
This is the strongest critique to the consensus that leader effects have
minimal impact on voting behaviour.
Garzia then makes party identiﬁcation the dependent variable and
compares a sociological model with a valence model to predict party
identiﬁcation. He shows that not only is the latter model more expli-
cative of party identiﬁcation than the sociological model, but that in
Britain, leader effects have grown in their ability to explain partisanship.
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The effect of leader voting in the three countries is measured
using exogenized party identiﬁcation measures. To be exogenous,
variables must be caused by forces outside the system of equations
and must not be correlated with the error terms. For partisanship,
these standards are readily obtainable with socioeconomic variables.
Then, partisanship (measured exogenously) and the leader baro-
meter is added to the model, as well as standard variables which
compose the socio-psychological model of voting behaviour. The
result is that leaders become more important in the three countries
concerned.
The author then employs a counterfactual strategy to evaluate the
net effect of leaders on voting behaviour. He compares the actual
electoral outcome with the (simulated) outcome of an election in
which the main party leaders are seen equally favourably by voters.
The ﬁndings from this analysis show that of the 20 elections under
consideration, 10 do indeed present a potentially decisive effect for
political leaders (as perceived and evaluated by voters) (Garzia
2014: 78).
This is, therefore, a book which takes seriously leader effects.
The use of instrumental variables to limit endogeneity is a positive
innovation that lends credence to the ﬁndings. Had panel data been
available, they would improve the reliability of the ﬁndings, both for
the construction of the instrumental variables, as well as making it
possible to distinguish between attitudes (party identiﬁcation, leader
barometer) in t-1 and behaviour (voting) in t. Had leader traits been
available it would be better to use them than leader barometers,
which tend to be highly correlated with attitudes towards party and
policies. Employing both panel data and leader traits would ensure
greater exogeneity among the relevant variables. In the future, fur-
ther reﬁning of the methodology as well as the quality of the data
available will be important to conﬁrm this research.
LEADERS AND THE MEDIA
The previous three books pose something of a puzzle. The books by
Cross and Pilet as well as by Passarelli provide a conservative view of
the degree to which parties change. Whether this is because they are
averse to change, or whether it is due to the fact that they are
constrained by constitutional formats as well as their own origins,
parties have not changed that much in the last decades. This does not
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mean that parties are not leader-centric. They may be so from
their creation and also because they adapt to their constitutional
framework (either presidential or semi-presidential). However, there
does not seem to be a strong trend towards a personalization of
parties in organizational terms. How, then, can we square this work
with Garzia’s hypothesis that leaders are determining for the parti-
sanship that electors develop? The answer may lie in the way in which
leaders use the media to reach out to electors. Given the decline in
party membership (Mair and van Biezen 2001), as well as the trust in
political parties generally, parties and their organizations are perhaps
playing a smaller role as intermediaries between citizens and politics.
This intermediation is increasingly taken on by the media, which
seem to play a very important role in the formation of political
attitudes. It may be that the psychological turn towards leaders
among electors derives from an increasing personalization of leaders
in the media. The examples which we have given concerning the
appearance of outsider politicians such as Trump, Berlusconi or
Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa certainly seem to point to the heightened
role the media can play in the personalization of politics.
Indeed, the books by Ana Inés Langer, The Personalisation of Politics
in the UK (2011), and Alessandro D’Arma, Media and Politics in
Contemporary Italy (2015), are in-depth studies which focus on the way
in which the media have contributed to the personalization of politics
in Britain and Italy. Langer’s volume is important on several levels.
First, it has a historical approach and analyses the phenomenon
between 1945 and 2009, thus taking seriously the longitudinal
dimension of the personalization phenomenon. Second, it focuses on
what the author designates ‘the politicisation of the private persona’ –
that is, references in the media to the personal qualities and private
lives of politicians. Speciﬁcally, it tries to measure the degree to which
the ‘sense of pervasiveness of the personal’ is conﬁrmed quantitatively.
The author performs a quantitative content analysis of articles
from two newspapers, the Guardian and The Times. The data sample
of 5,139 articles includes every article across two weeks in the ﬁrst
three years in ofﬁce of each prime minister, creating a sample that is
both representative of the normal coverage of prime ministers,
and as comparable as possible. Langer looks ﬁrst at references to
leadership and personal qualities, followed by mentions of leaders’
personal lives – thus grounding empirically whether there has indeed
been a trend towards politicization of the private persona (Langer
REVIEW ARTICLE 13
© The Author 2017. Published by Government and Opposition Limited and Cambridge University Press
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/g
ov
.2
01
7.
15
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 IC
S,
 o
n 
27
 Ju
n 
20
17
 a
t 0
9:
25
:4
9,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
2011: 71). How does the author classify the non-political dimensions
of politics? While acknowledging the difﬁculty in distinguishing
between adjectives that characterize leadership vs personal qualities,
the author proposes the following division: adjectives such as
‘competent, intelligent, strong, reliable, honest and experienced’
were taken as leadership qualities, while ‘nice, interesting, cool,
fun/good-humoured, loving, family oriented’ were associated with
personal qualities (Langer 2011: 82, ﬁgure 3.6).
The results show that ‘the overall presence of prime ministers in
the newspapers has grown over time. However, the increase has not
been systematic or substantial. The largest increase occurred in the
1960s’ (Langer 2011: 76). It is Harold Wilson, rather than Margaret
Thatcher or Tony Blair, who receives the highest ﬁgures for several
of the indicators of presidentialization.
The author argues that the most remarkable shift in recent
decades is, however, the politicization of the private persona. Indeed, ‘the
references to personal qualities are practically absent for any Prime
Minister before John Major’. This indicates important changes in the
deﬁnition of relevant character traits: it has broadened from an
almost exclusive focus on skills and qualities directly linked to ﬁtness
to govern to providing ‘a more rounded picture of the overall per-
sonalities of prime ministers, as leaders and human beings’ (Langer
2011: 88). Yet Langer (2011: 111) shows that despite having increased
in the period after Major, the politicization of the private persona is
still a very residual aspect of the leaders’ image: ‘[the study] does not
claim that it has become the most important dimension of party
communication, branding or media reporting’.
Even for Tony Blair, ‘who is regarded as the paradigmatic case of
the politicisation of the private persona only nine percent of the
articles examined made reference to these issues’ (Langer 2011: 165).
Yet we should not conclude that the change is insigniﬁcant. It is
indicative of recent politics that assessments of the political leader qua
human being now often play an important role in the interpretive
narratives of leaders’ rise and fall in popularity (Langer 2011: 166).
Not only that, but the leaders’ personal side has become an integral
part of the leader’s political identity, and also of the ‘new’ party, in the
case of Blair, as ‘his persona was crucial to changing what it meant to
be Labour’ (Langer 2011: 167).
For Italy, Alessandro D’Arma (2015) analysed how media and
politics have related, interacted and inﬂuenced one another in the
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last 20 years of Italian history, producing phenomena such as Silvio
Berlusconi and Beppe Grillo This book is important, ﬁrst, because it
focuses on the causes of personalization, and in particular the way
in which control of commercial television paved the way for a
personalization of politics, and, second, because it clearly depicts
a very bleak picture of the consequences of personalization.
D’Arma’s Media and Politics in Contemporary Italy is structured in the
following way: Chapter 1 appraises three causes which have been
advanced for Berlusconi’s personalization of Italian politics: ﬁrst, his
inﬂuential media ownership coupled with his media presence; second,
Berlusconi’s dominance of Italian politics for 20 years stemmed from
his ability to embody cultural values that he himself promoted earlier
via his television channels; third, his success was due to his ability to
master the rules of political communication in the era of televised
politics. Chapter 2 focuses on the public television network, RAI, and its
politicization before and after Berlusconi. Chapter 3 examines media
policy in Italy. It recounts the circumstances that allowed Berlusconi to
have a dominant position in commercial television in Italy, as well as
the left-wing government’s failure in the 1990s to curb Berlusconi’s
control of commercial television. Chapter 5 recounts the decline of
political journalism since Berlusconi. Chapters 4 to 6 consider the
changes to political journalism and the impact of the digital revolution
for the personalization of politics. The prevalence of internet use in
Italy has given rise to a new type of political party which again is highly
personalized – the 5 Star Movement, led by comedian Beppe Grillo.
The book is exemplary for its singling out of the evolution of
the media landscape as the main cause of the rise of Berlusconi.
Complete deregulation in the 1980s allowed Berlusconi to dominate
commercial television by the 1990s. Indeed, ‘nowhere else in Europe
was a single private actor allowed to run three national terrestrial
channels’ (D’Arma 2015, 45). Once Berlusconi decided to enter
politics, creating his own party and using his media group for
organizational purposes, research has shown that news coverage by
his three television networks systematically favoured Forza Italia
candidates (Marletti and Roncarolo 2000, in D’Arma 2015: 5). A
wealth of research has underlined the bias that Mediaset, Berlusconi’s
media group, gave to his party over the years (D’Arma, 2015, 6).
In addition, once Berlusconi became prime minister, he also had
substantial leverage over RAI, which had traditionally been controlled
by the political parties (Chapter 2).
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The form of personalization assumed by Berlusconi involved
the creation of a personal party, which was completely identiﬁed
with its leader and organizationally weak by design, as well as a very
strong ‘politicisation of the private persona’, where Berlusconi
sought to embody and represent the values disseminated through
his commercial channels in the previous decades. D’Arma cites
Ginsbourg, who characterizes Berlusconi’s television as deeply
conformist, repetitive, uncritically consumer-oriented, bombarded by
advertising, celebrating opulence, and promoting escapist dreams
(D’Arma 2015: 8). According to Sergio Fabbrini, ‘Berlusconi’s
persona was the message of Berlusconi’s personal party. He simpli-
ﬁed the language of politics, and staged his body like a celebrity, thus
becoming the champion of “pop politics” and blurring the traditional
boundaries between politics and entertainment’ (D’Arma 2015: 15).
Despite the resonance of these arguments, and the number
of authors cited, it seems that there is no Italian study equivalent
to Langer’s UK study, mapping the rise of the politicization of the
private persona in Italy.
These two studies, both of which focus on the media, are quite
different in their purpose. Langer sets out to measure personaliza-
tion in the post-war period in Britain, whereas D’Arma is seeking to
explore the causes and consequences of the personalization of the
Second Italian Republic by looking at the control of television
exercised by Berlusconi. They seem to diverge in the importance they
attribute to the personalization of politics. Langer’s careful study
points to the conclusion that the personalization of news was higher
in Wilson’s premiership than at any time since, whereas D’Arma
assumes from the beginning that Berlusconi marks a turning pointq
in the personalization of politics in Italy. Thus, more comparative
studies of other media are needed to reach more systematic agree-
ment on this issue. Even Langer suggests that looking only at quality
newspapers may have raised the bar too high for measuring the rise
of personalization, and ignoring television is particularly problematic
when studying personalization. These authors’ conclusions converge,
however, in how they identify the novelty of the ‘politicization of the
private persona’ which occurred both in Britain and in Italy, with
Blair and Berlusconi respectively. Even if Langer concludes that the
trend has not become dominant, with political dimensions being
more important, it is still a new factor which has changed the overall
leaders’ proﬁle.
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WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PERSONALIZATION
OF POLITICS?
This review article has attempted to present the way in which studies
of political leadership have contributed to our knowledge of
personality politics. We turn now to the way in which these authors
see the consequences and implications of their ﬁndings for the
functioning of democracy.
Cross and Pilet conclude that its impact is relatively modest,
namely it does not diversify the leader’s proﬁle by making it more
gender balanced, nor does it make party leader contests more
competitive. In Garzia’s volume, a whole chapter is dedicated to
the normative and empirical implications of putting leaders at the
centre of the socio-psychological model of voting. After weighing the
extant literature with a more or less positive view of the consequences
of personalization, Garzia reﬂects on the way in which the mediati-
zation of leadership, especially on television, has moved the public’s
attention away from the leaders’ role as politicians to those of
persons. This may have the ‘non-trivial effect of rendering political
choices indistinguishable from consumer choices, but in a context in
which choices are heavily inﬂuenced by emotions and tastes, rather
than reﬂective judgement’ (Simon, cited in Garzia 2014: 86).
Langer admits that she focused on the ‘politicisation of the private
persona’ because she was dissatisﬁed with the view that ‘the inclusion
of the personal must be damaging to democracy’. However, her
research led her to question the equally simplistic opposite view –
that the humanizing of politicians may have a positive effect by
bringing people closer to politics, ‘precisely because of the very
political implications of the [politicization of the private persona]’.
First, this is because the constant mediatization of the public persona
makes it more likely for ‘the greater the chances for citizens to
feel the leaders are falling short, […] because the combination of
unremitting mediated visibility and press negativity is not exactly
promising’ (Langer 2011: 172–3). Second, it is because the
accountability of leaders may be compromised. ‘[I]f the personal
became a predominant subject in the discussion of politics […]
it could make it easier to bypass the examination of hard facts’
(Langer 2011: 173). So, for instance, Prime Minister David Camer-
on’s emotions about the death of his young son and his publicizing of
the way the NHS treated the child well are not substitutes for an
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analysis of Conservative policy towards the health sector during his
premiership. When such personalization of policy issues occurs, it
serves to depoliticize issues, as if they depended only on personal
choice, masking and declassifying ideological options.
Third, according to Langer, the politicization of the private per-
sona also raises the issue of leader selection. Not only will people with
less linear pasts be more reluctant to run for ofﬁce, there is a gender
bias in this trend. ‘Family life, sports and personal appearance are all
mineﬁelds for women, and so is paradoxically, the expression of
emotions, which are valued in men as a revelation of their softer side,
but are often interpreted as weakness or lack of control in women’
(Langer 2011: 175).
The book by D’Arma is also overwhelmingly negative in its
assessment of the consequences of the personalization of politics in
Italy. First, the way in which politics and media fused during the
Berlusconi era transformed political journalism, which has basically
abandoned all pretence of impartiality (D’Arma 2015: ch. 5). Second,
Berlusconi’s mark on Italian politics was so strong that new leaders
who have since emerged have done so within the context of a
personalization of politics. D’Arma cites Beppe Grillo as well as Matteo
Renzi, the new left leader and former prime minister, as examples
of this trend. Indeed, Renzi is often called the ‘Berlusconi of the
Left’ (D’Arma 2015: 122). The drive towards celebrity politics, and
the continued reinforcement of the link between politics and enter-
tainment, may also have facilitated the emergence of a comedian as
political leader such as Beppe Grillo.
CONCLUSION
This review started by acknowledging the emergence of the outsider
politician, both in the US and Europe, stating that these developments
pose challenges to the understanding of the role of leadership in
democracies. The books analysed here try to cover different
dimensions of the growing importance of leaders, namely for political
parties, in electoral behaviour and in the media, in longitudinal terms.
Concerning parties, the research presents a case for moderate
personalization of parties. According to Passarelli, parties may be
personalized from birth and also as a result of adapting to their
constitutional framework (either presidential or semi-presidential).
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However, there does not seem to be a strong trend towards a
personalization of parties in organizational terms (Cross and Pilet
2015). These conservative conclusions run somewhat opposite to the
volume by Garzia (2014), which argues forcefully for the growing
importance of leaders in electoral behaviour. His research concurs
with others which have also found for the importance of leaders for
voting (Bittner 2011; Lobo and Curtice 2015).
Given the disjunction between the two dimensions of leader
importance in parties and elections, it is important to search for other
mechanisms which can become more important in personalizing
electoral behaviour. The obvious candidate is the media, and we
selected two books which deal with exactly the question of the
importance of the media for the personalization of politics in the UK
and Italy. Yet, Langer ﬁnds that personalization has not increased over
time in British media. What is new is the inclusion of personal
elements within the politician’s image. Still, these conclusions were
solely based on high-quality newspapers and may have missed the
wider picture in terms of television coverage as well as tabloids and the
rise in personalization. D’Arma, in covering the Berlusconi years, is
much more forceful in highlighting the media’s crucial importance for
the personalization of Italian politics. As is often the case, the research
does not all point in the same direction. However, it seems to me that
this group of books suggest that the lack of substantial change at
the party level does not necessarily mean that the personalization of
politics is not occurring through other intermediaries, namely the
media taken as a whole, and not only looking at quality newspapers.
The high quality of the studies surveyed raises a number of
important questions, going forward. The ﬁrst is benchmarking. The
maturity of the ﬁeld in measuring the importance of leaders begs the
question of how we measure the importance of leaders relative to
other indicators. Second, going beyond institutional contexts where
leaders may become more important, it may be important to discuss
which policies and policy outputs can explain personalization.
D’Arma’s book is the only one in this collection that tries to make a
connection between Berlusconi’s policies and the way in which they
contributed to increasing his power. Third, the rapid change in the
media landscape poses huge challenges in the measurement of
the personalization of the media: how to incorporate and measure
personalization at the level of the internet. Indeed, Langer (2011:
177) argues that ‘it would be important to combine soft and
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public affairs genres to enable us to explore the cross-fertilization
across outlets, which is a key reason why there is such a sense of
pervasiveness of the personal, which is not conﬁrmed quantitatively’.
Last, but certainly not least, the impact of personalization on the
range and quality of representation should also be taken seriously.
NOTES
1 The countries included are the following: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain and the UK.
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